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Abstract
Historically, countries often faced the difficult task of favoring one immigrant group over
another. Typically, this is in response to their inability to support those immigrants due to an
unstable economy. However, some scholars argue that during times of economic prosperity,
excluding immigrants may be the result of the group’s incapacity to assimilate to the nation’s
“cultural identity”. Since Chile’s conception as a nation and as one of the most prosperous Latin
American countries, they have received notably minuscule immigration rates. As a result,
Chileans prides themselves as a relatively homogeneous country. Consequently, in 2018,
President Sebastián Piñera differentiated visas between Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants. The
Venezuelan visa merely reiterated the general immigration requirements, while the Haitian visa
significantly restricted their immigration visa. Because Haitian immigrants make up 6th largest
immigrant population in Chile and maintained a low economic dependence upon the economy,
this case study sought to determine whether an economic approach or “cultural identity” theory
resulted in stricter immigration policies. Using a mixed research design of quantitative and
qualitative analysis, the findings revealed that Chileans opinions increased negatively with the
influx of immigrants, that did not coincide with the perception of their economic security.
Therefore, I assess that the “cultural identity” theory is more consistent with creating stricter visa
requirements for Haitian immigrants.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the Spring of 2019, upon arriving in Valparaíso, Chile, the community was still
discussing the fatal incident of the Haitian immigrant, Joane Florvil. Her story became known as
one of the most infamous incidents of immigrant injustice in Chile. In 2017, Joane’s life changed
when she and her daughter went to the police station to report how her husband became a victim
of job exploitation. Shortly after her arrival, Joane realized the police offered no translator, and
she decided to locate one to assist her. In Haiti, it is customary to leave a child with an
authoritative figure. This explains Joane’s lack of hesitation in leaving her daughter at the police
station. Within fifteen minutes, the police misinterpreted Joane’s departure as an act of child
abandonment. Consequently, the police arrested Joane, where she remained in custody for four
weeks. The official police report stated that Joane’s feelings of hopelessness caused her to have a
psychotic break. As a result, Joane repeatedly hit her head on the wall, causing her death.
Unofficially, numerous irregularities in police reports caused public suspicion and outrage
towards Joane’s death and, overall, her denial of rights (See Appendix 3C) (Vargas Rojas 2017).
After learning of this instance, I realized the discriminatory attitudes Chileans expressed towards
Haitian immigrants.
Throughout my semester in Chile, I observed numerous forms of economic and social
inequality against Haitian immigrants. I heard Chileans refer to Haitian street workers as
“negritos”. While the suffix “ito” is primarily used as a term of endearment in Chile, in this case,
it was used as a racial slur. More subtle acts of intolerance included derogatory caricatures drawn
on public buildings, which negatively depicted the prominent physical characteristics of Haitian
immigrants. Furthermore, these crude depictions were accompanied by comments such as “NOT
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WELCOME” (See Appendix 3b). As a result, I dedicated my research to Chilean immigration
and discovered that, in 2018, President Sebastián Piñera changed immigration laws to specify
distinctive visas for Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants (República de Chile 2018a).
Until 2018, all immigrants retained the same visa regulations and underwent the same
application process. However, the new visas target two immigrant groups: Haitians and
Venezuelans. Venezuelans and Haitians are not the largest immigrant population in Chile.
Peruvians constitute 25.2% of the immigrant population, while Colombians make up 14.1%.
Venezuelans rank the 3rd largest immigrant group with 11.1%; while, Haitians, who received
stricter visas, only rank as the 6th largest immigrant population with 8.4%. Numerically,
Venezuelans surpass Haitians; however, despite being a much smaller demographic, these
immigrants faced stringent legal barriers that required more money, resources, and efforts to
obtain a visa. By contrast, the new Venezuelan immigrants’ visas reflected the standard visa that
any foreigner applied for to gain entrance into Chile. The disparity in visas raises the question as
to why Chile excludes an immigrant group that makes up a minuscule proportion of the Chilean
population in comparison to other immigrants in the country (INE 2017). Analyzing quantitative
data suggests that Peruvians, Columbians, Venezuelans, and other large demographic groups
utilize the majority of Chile’s resources when it comes to immigration. However, Haitians have
been targeted through stricter immigration policies.
Before changing the visas, Chile maintained a relatively prosperous economy and an
average unemployment rate of 6.96% (INE 2017). With this in mind, Chile need not worry over
Haitian immigrants’ insignificant economic impact as one of the smaller immigrant groups. In
fact, it appears that with Haitians making up less than 1% of the entire immigrant population,
Chileans concerned over the potential economic ramifications of hosting them is not justified.
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Globally, nations excluding immigrants is not an uncommon practice. However, President
Piñera’s discernment between immigrants from various nations, who are economically equal,
makes Chile an outlier case. This case study utilizes a mixed research design to test whether an
economic or cultural identity threat influenced Chilean immigration laws. Consequently, this
leads to the overall question of this case study: What drove the recent immigration policy in
Chile?

Theoretical Framework
This thesis focuses on two potential justifications for changing immigration visas in
Chile. First, the economic approach interprets immigration policy changes because of classbased attempts to defend their job security. Whereas, the “cultural identity” theory suggests that
an immigrant’s threat to the host country’s concept of self and identity generates stricter
immigration policies (Meyers 2000). These two theories examine what drives immigration policy
and are used to determine if the new Chilean visas align with economic challenges or cultural
differences.
Most case studies analyzing migration in Western democratic countries found that stricter
immigration policies created during times of economic prosperity were a result of a threat to
“cultural identity”. When these countries speculate that a large influx of immigrants threatens
their economic stability, stricter laws are created. Additionally, national identity factors into the
creation and/or amendment of immigration laws. More than likely, the host country accepts
immigrant groups who more similarly reflect their national identity; therefore, excluding
immigrants facing adversity in cultural assimilation. I argue that Chile’s actions resemble that of
the Western nations’ due to the minuscule Haitian population and a relatively stable economy.
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Moreover, there are several more prominent immigration groups present in Chile, yet the
government placed more severe conditions on the smaller immigrant group, who poses less
economic dependence.

Case Selection
Due to its geographic location along the southwest coast of the Pacific Ocean and its
border along the Andes mountains, Chile has long remained a comparably isolated country. This
makes Chile an exception to other Latin American countries who experienced significant
immigration during and after their colonization. Other than receiving immigrants during the late
19th and early 20th centuries, immigration to Chile has been relatively low during most of the
20th century (Eyheramendy et al. 2015). As a result, this has affected Chile’s unique stances on
meticulously selecting between “desirable” and “undesirable” immigrants. Since the 1990s,
Chile’s stable economy has transformed the nation into a haven for immigrants (Cano and Soffia
2009). Chile’s record as a “non-immigrant” receiving country during previous centuries allowed
Chileans to pride themselves on their homogeneity (Echevarría et al. 2018, Walsh 2019). To
elaborate, a recent study indicated that Chileans identify themselves as “primarily white
mestizos” (Echevarría 2018). While the global perspective on “whiteness” varies significantly
from this viewpoint, Chileans have used their identity as a catalyst for racial intolerance against
immigrants that do not physically resemble the average Chilean or face obstacles in conforming
to its national identity.
In recent decades, Chile experienced a significant spike in its immigrant population.
From 1980 to 2017, Chile’s immigrant population increased by over 500% (Batavola 2017).
Despite this dramatic increase, worldwide, Chile ranks 71st with a 4.4% immigrant population,
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whereas the United States ranks 1st with an immigrant population of 14.4% (Batavola 2017, INE
2017). Therefore, Chile’s immigrant population of less than 5% is considered low in comparison
to other major immigrant-receiving countries. As a nation who primarily selects immigrants that
more closely reflect Chilean culture or further bolsters their homogeneous identity, they felt
threatened by such a significant increase in regional immigration. This case study is prominent
because it looks at how an economically prosperous nation, unaccustomed to immigration,
decides which immigrants to accept and why.

Hypothesis
I hypothesize that Chilean immigration laws changed due to a “cultural identity” threat.
The discriminatory visa design only enforces Chilean’s perceived homogeneous identity.
Scholars argue that identity, as a socially constructed concept, can restrict people from social,
political, and economic inclusion. While in Chile, I observed that Chileans often associate their
identity with the color of their skin when discussing immigration. Quite often, I heard Chileans
describe Venezuelan immigrants using positive descriptions while referring to Haitians as the
“others” who did not belong. To me, it appeared that Haitian immigrants posed less of a threat to
Chile’s economy, and more a threat to Chilean “cultural identity”. I began to consider what made
Haitians less desirable than Venezuelans according to society? I believe that this case study will
reveal that the “cultural identity” threat correlated with changing immigration visas because it is
improbable that during a period of economic prosperity, Chileans felt their job security
threatened. However, knowing that Haitian immigrants make up less than 1% of the immigrant
population and maintain the most diverse culture of all immigrants, Chileans likely felt their
“cultural identity” threatened.

Geist 6

Data and Methods
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Did a threat to the economy or cultural identity
drive recent immigration policy in Chile? To answer the question, this study adopts a mixed
research design that uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis. I analyze whether Chile’s
adoption of stricter immigration laws coincides with the years that experienced more economic
stagnation. Because most of the data derives from Chilean-centered databases and are in Spanish,
all translations come from the author unless otherwise stated. Quantitative analysis includes the
makeup of the immigrant population, types of visas granted, immigrant economic dependence,
and opinions of the economy. Qualitative data analyzes the language used in the new visas and
humanitarian flights. These variables derive from public opinion surveys and censuses to provide
a basis to test the hypothesis that visa differentiation occurred in response to a cultural threat,
rather than an economic threat.
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Chapter 2: Different Paths to Immigration Policy

This study focuses on two explanations for how nations treat immigrants. One possibility
is that they are perceived as an economic threat. Another possibility is that immigrants are a
threat to cultural identity. This case study seeks to discover whether Chile’s rejection of Haitian
immigrants is consistent with an economic or cultural identity threat. In this thesis, I will be
testing the theories of the economic approach and the “cultural identity” theory. The economic
approach describes immigration policies as an economically driven and class-based political
process based on capitalism. Whereas, the “cultural identity” theory reveals that historical
experiences, cultural idioms, and social conflicts explain the formation of immigration policies
(Meyers 2000).
The economic approach mentions the term “most favored nation”, which explains that
immigrant-receiving countries prefer higher-skilled immigrants who primarily come from these
select countries (North 2014). Within the “cultural identity” theory, concepts discussed include
heterogeneity, homogeneity, mestizaje, “otherness”, in-groups, and out-groups. Homogeneous
populations are characterized according to ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics, whereas
heterogeneous states exhibit more diverse identities in those aspects (Money 1999). Furthermore,
the ideology of mestizaje, the result of mixing indigenous races with Spaniard colonizers,
homogenized Latin American populations (Bailey and Telles 2013). As a result, the current
Chilean-born inhabitants consider immigrants that appear physically different as “others”, which
is more likely to place them into out-groups in society (Berg 2015) and can cause discriminatory
sentiment (Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). I analyze how Chile’s lack of immigration, then a
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sudden influx of immigrants, could have resulted in one of these theories influencing stricter
immigration policies.

Economic Approach
The economic approach theorizes that the creation of strict immigration policies is a
result of the lower working class competing with immigrants for jobs. As a result, the current
workers feel their economic security threatened (Meyers 2000, Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven
2013). In a study of the Western European immigration experience, the scholar concluded that
members of the labor force felt endangered by the potential of losing their jobs and being forced
into new positions that may require costly training. Testing this theoretical argument in this case
study can show whether it applies outside of the European context. Scholars further argue that in
a capitalistic society, immigrants are more likely to receive jobs because they are young, easily
replaced, endure the most undesirable working conditions, and, overall, receive less pay. Thus,
the current labor force is more likely to oppose immigration because they suspect immigrants of
robbing them of their jobs (Castells 1975, Nikolinakos 1975). In the case of Chile, Venezuelans
and Haitians are typically segregated in their employment opportunities. For example,
Venezuelans often work in customer service positions, such as waiters and dishwashers, while
Haitians work more informally in the streets selling common goods to locals.
Scholars explains that this economic approach results in immigration policies that favor
immigrants from preferred countries, often mentioning the term “most favored nation”. This term
places immigrants into two categories: higher-skilled immigrants contributing to the economy,
and lower-skilled immigrants who require government assistance. Consequently, the “most
favored nations” often receive larger immigrant quotas (North 2014, Stefoni 2011). Specifically,
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during the 1920s and 1960s, immigrant-receiving countries provided nations in northern and
western Europe larger immigrant quotas because they were considered highly skilled. Pursuing
this economic approach, in the 20th century, the United States gave large immigrant quotas to
Great Britain in an effort to increase the number of highly skilled workers (North 2014).
Despite today’s elimination of immigrant quotas, other immigration laws numerically
limit the number of “unwanted” immigrants (North 2014). Therefore, it is more likely that
immigrants fleeing crises, who have not had the opportunity or ability to obtain experience in
highly skilled professions, are less likely to be considered immigrants from the “most favored
nations”. According to Castells, during periods of economic recession, the working class
typically fears job loss in competition with immigrant workers (Castells 1975). Theoretically, if
the economy is thriving, the working class is less likely to worry about job insecurity. However,
Chile, who experienced significant economic growth in the 1990s, reacted negatively to influxes
of immigrants from nations experiencing crises.
Likewise, there are further contradictions to this economic approach. For example, the
theory fails to expound upon the potential effects of diverse ethnic origins on the host country’s
society (Meyers 2000). Presently, Chile is experiencing an influx of culturally diverse
immigrants from Haiti, which makes it challenging to prove that the economic approach
validates changing visa laws and procedures. The theory also fails to consider the political,
societal, and demographic factors within the current economic situation that might influence
immigration laws (Nikolinakos 1975). Similarly, there is a negative relationship between
immigration and unemployment rates, linking periods of economic prosperity to decreased
unemployment rates (Money 1999). Nevertheless, this factor contradicts the economic approach
in Chile’s case because it is considered one of the most prosperous countries in Latin America.
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Furthermore, the economic approach often requires that the leader of the country changes
immigration policies due to significant pressure from the working-class population (Money
1999). Yet, survey data from 2018 to 2019 reveals that household income did not correlate with
President Piñera’s approval ratings (LAPOP 2019). This signifies that socioeconomic status did
not determine a person’s endorsement of President Piñera nor his policies. Therefore, it is
unlikely that workers of low socioeconomic status, who would have felt their job security
threatened, influenced Piñera’s decision to change immigration policies.

“Cultural Identity” Theory
The other approach in this case study is the “cultural identity” approach, which analyzes
how a country’s history, ethnicity, cultural heritage, and identity shape immigration policies. A
nation’s “cultural identity” is a contested, fluid social boundary that becomes significant when
the current inhabitants feel threatened by potential immigration (Meyers 2000). One of the most
critical factors in defining a country’s level of immigrant tolerance is how it regards its own
national identity. When speaking about immigration, countries often say what they are not rather
than what they are. Such is the case of Haitian immigrants in Chile who more likely state that
Chilean values are not similar to Haitians. As a result, nations perceive immigrants who do not
conform to their identity as “dirty, uncivilized, and less than fully human”. Evidence of this is
found in the 1920s when the United States excluded Asian immigrants strictly for their ethnic
and cultural differences (Meilaender 2001, Money 1999). At first glance, it appears this may
explain Chile’s changed policies that exclude Haitians, the immigrant group who least represents
Chilean cultural identity.
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When discussing the “cultural identity” theory, it is crucial to determine what aspect of
identity the host population believes unifies them. Scholars argue that typical non-immigrantreceiving nations base their “cultural identity” on a relatively common culture or ethnicity
(Meyers 2000). A nation’s previous insularity to immigration often creates a lower threshold of
tolerance than a heterogeneous nation. This is evident in Chile’s case, which, as a nonimmigrant-receiving country, produced a perceived ethnically and culturally dominant
population. On the other hand, nations built upon immigration produce racially disparate
populations and are more likely to accept immigrants (Meyers 2000, Money 1999). In the
European context, immigrant acceptance correlated with a shared racial identity; therefore,
anyone who did not conform to that identity posed a threat to national unity (Meissner 1992).
The perceived homogeneity of a population often delineates whether the current
population feels threatened by diverse immigrants (Money 1999). Moreover, scholars warn of
the potential adverse effects on a society that is “not used to social heterogeneity” (Doña Reveco
and Mullan 2014). Chile experienced these adverse effects following the arrival of Haitian
immigrants, which resulted in discriminatory actions, such as the extreme case of Joane Florvil.
Many activists theorize that this violation of rights could have been avoided if the government
had provided an adequate translator. However, because Joane did not conform to Chile’s
“cultural identity”, she was not treated like a regular citizen, nor a priority. Additionally,
negative sentiments that arose in Chile include inequality in the education system, violence
against children and adults, and discrimination in the workforce.
To continue the concept of homogeneity, mestizaje, the mixing of races through
marriage, occurred in Latin American countries in response to various political, economic, and
cultural forces. Consequently, this informal social construct integrated races, weakened racial
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distinctions, and emphasized whiteness. The ideology of mestizaje caused some Latin American
countries, such as Argentina and Chile, to appear more homogeneous. However, countries with
predominantly Afro-descendant or indigenous populations, such as Brazil and Bolivia, developed
a more heterogeneous society. Recently, both Brazil and Bolivia implemented racial reforms to
confront their evident stratification (Bailey and Telles 2013, Green, Skidmore, and Smith 2014).
However, other Latin American countries recently experiencing a change in their homogeneous
society are less willing to create laws to diminish racial inequality (Money 1999). Consistently,
Latin American migrants make up similar groups in search of work (Lawrence 2015); hence, the
influx of Haitian immigrants, who uphold a more diverse culture and ethnicity, threatened
Chilean identity.
Moreover, people’s identities categorize them into in-groups or out-groups. The outgroup generally faces discrimination and exclusion from society since it is easier to categorize
them as different (Berg 2015, Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). Great Britain illustrates this in
using the common terminology “immigrants” to refer to any “colored people” regardless of
whether they are immigrants (Bovenkerk, Miles, and Verbunt 1991). In the case of Great Britain,
society automatically associates dissimilar people as immigrants. This example shows that it is
common for typically “whiter” nations to use racialization to set apart citizens from immigrants.
Comparably, a study scrutinizing Chilean media’s use of terminology revealed a discrepancy in
describing immigrants. While Venezuelans were referred to as “political victims”, Haitians were
described as “others” (Valenzuela-Vergara 2018). Thus, the media cast Haitian immigrants in a
negative light instead of regarding them as an immigrant group also in need of aid.
Additionally, it is common for citizens to coin immigrants as “others” when they possess
an identity that does not conform to the host nation. In the host country, an uneven geographic
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distribution makes immigrants more distinguishable because they primarily settle in areas of
opportunity (Money 1999). This leads the citizens to develop sentiments such as the “others”
possessing an identity that is “unnatural, barbaric, and uncivilized” (Meilaender 2001). Placing
these “others” into a derogative category often leads to the idea that immigrants threaten the
common good of society (Doña Reveco and Mullan 2014). Likewise, the social media study also
revealed that Haitian immigrants are referred to as “delinquents, deviant, and dangerous”
(Valenzuela-Vergara 2018). This example shows how the term “others” leads to the
criminalization of immigrants, despite Chile’s crime rates not increasing with an influx in
immigration.
At the same time, further debates disprove the “cultural identity” theory because it
downplays the importance of external and situational factors that may have influenced the
creation of stricter immigration laws. For instance, immigration places political pressure on the
local level, which rarely amounts to political change. Unless the topic of immigration is relevant
to maintaining an upcoming electoral majority, politicians are more likely to ignore these
political pressures. Yet again, the Chilean case is an exception to this counter argument because
immigration was a crucial topic in Piñera’s upcoming election in 2018. Also, the “cultural
identity” theory disregards the effects of current economic trends on the creation of a country’s
immigration policies (Meyers 2000, Money 1999). To reiterate, immigration and unemployment
are contributing factors to a country’s perceived economic stability. Chile’s case rebuttals this
argument by maintaining a prosperous economy and low unemployment rates. Universally, it
remains challenging to definitively correlate stricter immigration policies with a threat to
“cultural identity” due to contributing political, economic, and societal factors.
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Political Factor Consideration
Seeing that both theories fail to consider the political factors that could have influenced
Piñera’s decision to change the visas, this portion of the thesis discusses the potential political
effects. It is important to note that the visa, created by a conservative Chilean president, appears
to show preference towards Venezuelan immigrants who are fleeing an authoritarian, socialist
government. It is possible that President Piñera, in an effort to punish the spread of socialism
consuming Venezuela, sympathized with Venezuelan immigrants. Many democratic nations
sought to reprove the “Pink Tide”, which are countries who veered away from democracy
towards socialism. To increase ambiguity for the new immigration policies, Piñera created two
new visas for Venezuelans and Haitians. However, rather than showing preference towards
Venezuelan immigrants, the new visa merely reflects the standard visa that other immigrants
obtain. Furthermore, I also argue that appealing to public approval likely influenced Piñera’s
decision instead of showing sympathy to immigrants fleeing socialism.
During the presidential campaign in 2018, the public and candidates heavily contested
immigration reforms. The candidate Alejandro Guillier proposed strict immigration reforms,
similar to Piñera’s former immigration proposals. Whereas the other candidate, Beatriz Sánchez,
supported immigration to Chile. During his first term, Piñera failed to change immigration
reforms, so he promised his anti-immigration supporters that, if elected, he would either propose
a new reform or attempt to renew his failed policy. The elections required a runoff between
Piñera and Guillier, which placed the candidates with the most restricting stances on immigration
against each other. Subsequently, Piñera further hardened his stance on immigration, winning
over public sentiment and the presidential election (Concha-Villanueva 2018, Doña Reveco
2018). Since Chilean public opinion is infamous for creating nationwide protests, I deduce that
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Piñera followed through on his plans to create a new immigration reform to please the public
demand for a solution.
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Chapter 3: Historical Perspective of Chilean Immigration

Understanding Chile’s history of immigration is imperative when analyzing why
President Piñera changed immigration laws. Historically, scholars studied Latin American
countries as migrant-sending nations rather than migrant-receiving nations. Yet, due to conflicts,
economic failure, and authoritarian governments, intraregional immigration now characterizes
many Latin American countries. Due to Chile’s geographic location, immigration patterns
emerged that vary greatly in comparison to other Latin American countries. As a result, Chileans
developed a homogeneous identity that influenced their perception of immigrants (Eyheramendy
et al. 2015). Specifically, Chileans are more selective than other Latin American countries
regarding immigration. Today, the increase in racially diverse immigration challenges Chilean’s
insular attitudes. Considering Chile’s unique historical influxes of immigration provides a
foundation to understand whom Chile constitutes as a “desirable” immigrant.

Colonization and the Indigenous Population
During the Spanish colonization of the Americas, Chile remained an outlier. Central
American and Andean countries, excluding Chile, experienced more severe forms of
colonization. Spain considered these countries valuable due to its accessibility, possession of
precious metals, fertile terrain, or other valuable resources. By contrast, Spain neglected the
peripheral colony of Chile, due to its perceived lack of resources, remote location, and diverse
geography. However, upon realizing Chile’s potential for agricultural production, Spain
established a more prominent role in the country. Nonetheless, Spain’s investment in Chile paled
in comparison to other Latin American colonies.
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Accordingly, colonization affected Latin America’s indigenous populations in various
ways due to unique geographic features. Primarily the dispersal of indigenous populations and
the Spanish incremental integration in Central America, Venezuela, and Colombia, allowed
retainment of racial diversity. Although European disease unknowingly killed millions of
indigenous people throughout Latin America, comparatively, Chile’s concentrated indigenous
population was nearly eradicated. To bolster the existing labor force, the Spanish frequently
brought African slaves to its colonies, which often resulted in a highly polarized, biracial state.
However, because Chile was a non-essential asset to Spain, the Afro-slave population was
minimal (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014).
Chile, like other Spanish colonies, experienced the informal process of mestizaje. The
various political, economic, and cultural factors gradually led many Latin American countries to
have interracial marriages. Mestizaje led to a caste system that associated “white” physical traits
with positions of power and dignity. Therefore, without knowing, Chileans supported the
assertion that specific racial characteristics result in more social dominance. However, since
Spain eradicated most of Chile’s indigenous population and did not bring an abundant African
slave population to the territory, mestizaje allowed Chile to create a relatively homogeneous
mestizo population (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014). This form of “blanquedad,” also known as
whitening, generated stereotypes that would affect how Chileans viewed immigration in their
post-colonial period.

Desirable Versus Undesirable Immigrants
In the 19th century, Latin American independence from Spanish rule allowed nations to
choose whether to accept immigrants or not. As is the case with many former colonies that
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experienced violent independence wars, Mexico resented its colonizers and banned the Spanish.
Consequently, Mexico did not acquire a European-born working class. On the other hand, many
countries wanted to attract immigrants to enhance their industries. For example, Argentina
utilized southern European immigrants to strengthen its labor force, thus increasing the
population by 60% (Green, Skidmore, Smith 2014). Similarly, Chile broadened its Spanish,
English, German, and Italian immigrant population. Chilean literature reveals that European
immigrants contributed to “economic, cultural, and social” aspects of the nation (Cano, Pizarro,
and Soffia 2009). Throughout the 19th century, the government implemented reforms to promote
the “Colonization Law” (Ley de colonización), which incentivized European immigrants with
machinery and uncultivated land. The “General Colonization Agency in Europe” (Agencia
General de Colonización en Europa) placed Chilean offices in European countries to encourage
immigration to Chile (Aninat and Vergara 2019). A famous Chilean historian described that the
“idea was not only to bring more people to an almost uninhabited country, but to bring better
people” (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009).
Nevertheless, during the 1800s, Chile did not consider all immigrants as “desirable”.
Chile’s former racial hierarchy developed negative sentiments toward immigrants who did not
contribute significantly to their society. To illustrate, after the Pacific War in 1879, Chile gained
vast, valuable land that led to the discovery of copper nitrate (salpetre) (Eyheramendy et al.
2015). To Chile’s benefit, this increased European investors and provided labor for the
workforce. To their detriment, expanding their geographical boundaries meant that Chile now
faced regional immigration. The 1885 census revealed that 67% of immigrants in Chile were
Bolivian, Peruvian, and Argentinian (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009, Green, Skidmore, and
Smith 2014). Furthermore, Chile’s newly discovered copper mines tempted many Asian
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immigrants, specifically the Chinese, to work in Chile. However, the number of Asian
immigrants in Chile was minute to those working in Peru and Cuba (Aninat and Vergara 2019).
Expanding their selective immigration process in the early 20th century, Chile developed
its concept of a “desirable” immigrant, which were those who arrived through the “Colonization
Program” (Stefoni 2011). Although the program resulted in European immigration, Argentina
received ten times more European immigrants than Chile (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009).
This proves that on a regional scale, “desirable” immigration to Chile was not quite significant.
Again, their new policies appeared to be progressive, yet, in reality, allowed for little growth.
Similarly, the arrival of Arab immigrants fleeing the fallen Ottoman Empire led to the
Chilean government’s further restriction of immigration laws. The “Residence of Undesirable
Elements Law” (Ley de residencia de elementos indeseables), facilitated the deportation of
“harmful” and “undesirable” immigrants (República de Chile 1918). In the same manner, at the
end of WWII, Chile created a reform that would turn away immigrants who did not bring
“cultural capital” to the state. Additionally, in 1953, a law was passed that “Will help to perfect
the biological conditions of the race…the incorporation of easily assimilated elements,
preventing the entry of undesirable or unadaptable individuals” (contribuirá a perfeccionar las
condiciones biológicas de la raza… la incorporación de elementos fácilmente asimilables,
evitando el ingreso de individuos indeseables o inadaptables) (Aninat and Vergara 2019 and
Stefoni 2011). During the first half of the 20th century, Chileans established laws that both
promoted “desirable” immigrants who easily assimilated to their culture and benefitted their
homogeneous identity and excluded “undesirable” immigrants who harmed Chilean’s unified
identity.
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Sending Political Refugees
Although the number of immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries was relatively
insignificant in comparison to the actual Chilean population, immigration nearly ceased during
the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet. This was due to the dictator exemplifying the nationalistic
views expressed during the mid-20th century. Evidence of this is demonstrated in the
implementation of the “Foreigner’s Law” (Ley de Extranjería) (República de Chile 1975), which
reinforced the idea that foreigners threatened the unity of the nation and its Spanish ancestry
(Sirlopú and Van Oudenhoven 2013, Stefoni 2011). From 1973 until the late 80s, Chile’s
economic and political crisis disincentivized immigration. In fact, in 1982, Chile had the lowest
immigrant population in Latin America (Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009). A few years later,
Pinochet further changed the immigration law with the “Decreto Supremo No. 597” to restrict
immigrants who were considered “undesirable” from immigration to Chile (República de Chile
1984). As a result, a portion of the current Chilean population became accustomed to restricting
immigrants, which likely affected their outlook on immigration today.
In effect, while immigration decreased, emigration increased as Chileans fled the
Pinochet regime, causing a -36.7% drop in residency. Estimates place nearly 200,000 Chileans
leaving the country between 1973 and 1986. Most exiles faced obstacles with integrating into a
new occupation, language, and country. In contradiction to the exiling of citizens, two weeks
before the scheduled 1988 plebiscite, Pinochet announced that all remaining exiles were free to
return home. With the election of Patricio Aylwin in 1989, most exiled Chileans returned home
(Cano, Pizarro, and Soffia 2009). The regime exiling citizens provided a framework to
understand what it feels like to establish a home in a new country. In theory, this uncertainty
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should have changed Chilean outlook to be more accepting of immigrants. In practice, with the
return of democracy, Chilean identity continued to impact exclusionary immigration policies.

From Dictatorship to Democracy
During the transition to democracy in the 1990s, Chile experienced economic prosperity,
political stability, and low unemployment rates (Cano and Soffia 2009, Sirlopú and Van
Oudenhoven 2013). This was not the case for the economies of many surrounding countries
whose deteriorating conditions caused mass immigration. Specifically, Chile received
immigrants from Argentina, Peru, and Bolivia (Doña Reveco 2018). During this period, Chile
transitioned from a migrant-sending country to a high-income, migrant-receiving country (Doña
Reveco and Mullan 2014). As a result, former President Eduardo Frei developed a legislation
program in 1995, which provided temporary visas to immigrants. Consequentially, 16,764
Peruvians and 2,116 Bolivians received temporary legal residency in Chile. Peruvians and
Colombians reported that they faced discrimination in Chile, yet throughout time, this abated due
to their similar cultures and ethnicities. To expound, immigrant groups found that once they built
relationships with Chilean nationals and assimilated into the culture, the discrimination
dissipated (Caqueo-Urízar et al. 2017). Despite the resolution between Chileans and these
immigrants, ultimately, there was no path toward permanent residency. Despite their illegal
status, immigrants stayed after their visas expired. This presented a conflict because Pinochet’s
1975 law, also known as the “policy of no policy”, remains intact, allowing immigrants to
overstay their permits (Doña Reveco 2018). As a result, the Chilean population felt they lacked
effective immigration policies.
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Presidential Immigration Reforms
Further problems arose as immigration escalated, calling for amendments to Pinochet’s
immigration law. Over the past 30 years, immigration in Chile increased from an average of
0.8% to 4.4%. (INE 2017). Despite Chile ranking 71st globally in terms of immigration, the
dramatic spike in immigrants presented a sudden change in the dynamic of the Chilean
population. Considering that, other countries accustomed to immigration, typically experience
these effects gradually. Recent Chilean administrations attempted to address the problem yet
failed to replace the 1975 immigration law. As a result, Chilean presidents consistently
implement temporary directives, which do not require approval from congress and are easily
changed or eliminated with a new administration (Doña Reveco 2018).
In addition to former President Michelle Bachelet’s pro-immigration directives, she
pushed several progressive initiatives to overturn the 1975 law but failed (República de Chile
2014). At the opposite end of the spectrum, during President Sebastián Piñera’s first term, his
directives focused on excluding low-skilled immigrants. Continuing with Piñera’s second and
current term in office, his views toward immigration became the focal point of his presidency
(Doña Reveco 2018). Before 2018, previous laws defined what a “desirable” immigrant is, yet
the visa requirements remained the same for all immigrants. However, in 2018, Piñera imposed
stricter regulations for Haitian visas and made the Venezuelan visa more closely reflect the visa
requirements for all other immigrants.
At present, Chile is a haven for Venezuelans and Haitians fleeing the worsening political
crises in their respective countries. While both immigrant groups are similar in their reason for
needing a haven, Chileans only view Haitian immigrants as a dissimilar addition in ethnicity. It
is pertinent to differentiate how the visas place Haitian immigrants at a disadvantage. The
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disparaging language used in the visas reflects the general sentiment towards Haitian and
Venezuelan immigrants. For example, Venezuelans have the “Temporary Visa of Democratic
Responsibility” (Visa Temporaria de Responsabilidad Democrática) (See Appendix 1A),
insinuating Chile’s obligation to care for a regional country. While Haitians have the “Simple
Tourist Consular Visa” (Visa Consular de Turismo Simple) (See Appendix 1B), inadvertently
denying their need to seek residence in a functioning country. Furthermore, the Chilean
government classified Haitians tourist visa as “recreational, sports, health, education, business,
family, or religious or other similar purposes” (República de Chile 2018a). In summary, this
language refuses to acknowledge the failed state of Haiti in which the immigrants are attempting
to leave and classifies their purpose in Chile as merely tourism.
Comparing the visa requirements, the Venezuelan visa more closely reflects the
requirements for the regular foreigner’s visa. The duration of the “Temporary Visa of
Democratic Responsibility,” allows Venezuelans a “Temporary Residence” (Residencia
Temporal) (See Appendix 2A) of one year with the option of requesting “Definitive Residence”
(Residencia Definitiva) (See Appendix 2B). Again, the discrepancies between the two visas
illustrate that Chile remains steadfast in its restrictive immigration stance. The Haitian “Simple
Tourist Consular Visa” places many more sanctions, such as only permitting thirty days of
residency. Whereas, in the past, Haitians could travel to Chile and apply for a work visa with one
year’s residency. They are also required to prove the purchase of a round trip flight, hotel
reservation, invitation letter, and accreditation of economic solvency (República de Chile 2018a).
Respectively, Haitians run the risk of losing money if the government denies their visa.
Intending to appear more progressive, Chile established the “Temporary Family
Reunification Visas” (Visa Temporaria de Reunificación Familiar) (See Appendix 1C) for
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Haitian immigrants. This provides a one-year visa if they can prove they have legal family
members in Chile. Disparagingly, many restrictions and requirements present further obstacles to
Haitian immigrants. To demonstrate, only 10,000 of these visas are granted annually and require
family members to attend school until the age of 24 (República de Chile 2018a). This school
obligation is not easily accomplished because, on average, Haitians possess 9.5 years of
education (INE 2017). Despite this visa appearing to be an opportunity for further Haitian
immigration, its limitations likely prevent a majority of them from qualifying for the visa.
Furthering the façade, in August of 2018, President Piñera offered free, humanitarian
flights “for the safe and orderly return of Haitian nationals to their home country” (para el
regreso seguro y ordenado de nacionales haitianos a su país de origen) (See Appendix 3A)
(República de Chile 2018a). Frequently, this initiative was promoted in a positive manner that
allowed Haitians to reunite with their family members, free of charge. However, many critics
argued that this was a form of forced deportation because, not only did it encourage Haitian
immigrants to leave, it also required signing a nine-year contract to not return to Chile
(República de Chile 2018a). Succinctly, the current administration of President Piñera
implemented policies and reforms that restrict Haitian immigration while allowing Venezuelan
immigrants access to Chile.
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Chapter 4: Data and Analysis

Quantitative and qualitative analysis is used in this thesis to determine if the restrictive
Haitian visa was created due to a perceived economic or “cultural identity” threat posed by
Haitian immigrants. This section consists of data that shows the demographic makeup of
immigrants compared to the Chilean population, visas granted to Venezuelans and Haitians, and
immigrant economic dependence. Further analysis is composed of public opinion surveys to
show how Chileans perceive immigration and the humanitarian flights offered to Haitian
immigrants. Finally, the section concludes with an analysis of the public’s perception of the
economy.
Comparing Haitian and Venezuelan populations is essential when assessing how large
each group is. Analyzing the number of visas granted to each group will reveal if preference
towards Venezuelans was established prior to changing visa policies. In addition, establishing
which group depends more on the Chilean economy shows whether there was a correlation
between a perceived economic threat, or a real one. Because the economic approach focuses on
the fear of losing economic security, it is important to measure how secure Chileans felt in their
financial capabilities. Overall, analysis of the data will help test whether the economic approach
or the “cultural identity” theory correlates with changing the visas.

Venezuelan and Haitian Immigrants in Chile
Formally, President Sebastián Piñera created new visas regulations because “it is urgent
to reformulate and modernize to account for the current needs of the country” (se hace urgente
reformular y modernizar para dar cuenta de las necesidades actuales del país) (República de
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Chile 2018b). In practice, the new visas attempt to quell the flood of immigrants. If a
government is unable to sustain an overwhelming surge of immigrants, it is justifiable to change
immigration visas to sustain them. Therefore, I ask, is there a significant statistical difference
between the number of Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants in Chile?
Statistics of the number of immigrants in Chile dating from 1990 to 2017 come from
Chile’s National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas) census reports (INE
2017). Since 1843, the INE produces official statistics and censuses and develops nearly 70
statistical products, including demographic statistics and other vital information (INE 2017). The
data base is an advantageous source because it provides unbiased statistics to compare previous
and current immigration. More specifically, the INE provides data on the current ratio of Haitian
to Venezuelan immigrants that reside in Chile.
The data from Graph 1 shows that Venezuelan and Haitian immigration to Chile has
increased ten-fold since the 1990s. Increased immigration correlates to the rise in economic
prosperity that Chile experienced during its return to democracy. Before 1990 until 2009, Graph
1 illustrates that there were significantly more Venezuelan than Haitian immigrants. However,
between 2000-2009, both groups of immigrants increased dramatically. It also shows that in
between 2010-2017, there were roughly 20,000 more Venezuelan immigrants than Haitian
immigrants, meaning that Venezuelans would pose more of an economic dependence to the
nation. The entirety of the immigrant population makes up less than 5% of the total Chilean
population, which includes immigrants of other nationalities (INE 2017). As stated previously,
an immigrant population of less than 5% ranks quite low on a global scale. Therefore, the
number of Haitian and Venezuelan immigrants should not substantially affect the Chilean
economy.
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Visas Granted to Venezuelans and Haitians
To understand the driving factors behind Chile’s visa reform, it is important to see the
number of visas granted to Venezuelans and Haitians prior to the new policies. This section
compares the “Temporary Visas Granted” (Temporaria Visas Ortogadas) to the “Definitive
Permanence Visas Granted” (Permanencias Definitivas Otorgadas). The “Temporary Visa”
allows foreigners to reside in Chile temporarily permitting seasonal work, attending a staterecognized educational establishment, seeking refuge for humanitarian reasons, partaking in
medical treatments, or participating in sanctioned religious organizations (República de Chile
2019b). The conditions for the “Definitive Permanence Visas” require resources or connections
that Haitian immigrants are unlikely to possess. Such as, the immigrant must either have family
ties with definitive nationals or residents in Chile, work for specific businesses, or contribute
significantly to the “social, cultural, artistic, scientific, and sporting sphere” of Chile (República
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de Chile 2019b). In summation, this data will reveal whether Venezuelans were granted
permanent residency visas before establishing the new policies.
Chile’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Migration (Departamento de Extranjería y
Migración) provides migratory statistics on the number of “Temporary Visas Granted” and
“Definitive Permanence Visas Granted” (República de Chile 2019b). The department
differentiates between immigrant groups from varying countries across time, which is compiled
through visa applications. This data provides unbiased statistics to determine whether
Venezuelan or Haitian immigrants were more likely to receive a visa before and after changing
the visa regulations.
Graph 2 shows that between 2015-2016, Venezuelans and Haitians received nearly the
same number of temporary visas. However, from 2017-2018, Venezuelans obtained 20,00025,000 more temporary visas than Haitians. In a similar manner, Graph 3 shows that between
2015-2016 the number of permanent visas to Venezuelans and Haitians increased
proportionately. Whereas, in 2018, the number of permanent visas granted to Venezuelans
doubled by nearly 18,000 visas whereas, the number of Haitian immigrants only rose by 3,500.
These numerical discrepancies in the permanent visas granted are consistent with the creation of
the 2018 visa, which allowed Venezuelan immigrants the same accessibility to visas while
creating stricter policies for Haitian immigrants to obtain the visa. Graph 3 also reveals that the
Chilean government expressed preference towards Venezuelan immigrants prior to changing the
laws while hindering the number of Haitians that received definitive visas. Thus, the data
reiterates that while Chile proposed both immigration visas to appear less discriminatory towards
Haitian immigrants, they did, in fact, specifically target Haitian immigrants.

Geist 29

Temporary Visas Granted
160000
140000
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000

0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Venezuela

2015

2016

2017

2018

2017

2018

Haiti

Graph 2 (República de Chile 2019b)

Definitive Permanence Visas Granted
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Venezuela

2015

2016

Haiti

Graph 3 (República de Chile 2019b).
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Venezuelan and Haitian Economic Dependence
Another aspect that must be considered is the economic dependency of both Venezuelans
and Haitians in Chile. In theory, if an immigrant posed an insurmountable economic burden on
that nation, the economic approach would explain changes in immigration laws. However, if a
prosperous nation containing two immigrant groups -one posing a significant financial burden,
and one that does not- chooses to exclude the group with less economic dependence, the
causation likely aligns with non-monetary reasons. This section seeks to answer the question:
Which group of immigrants is more likely to be economically dependent on the Chilean
government?
The INE 2017 Census measured the potential level of economic dependency immigrants
have on the Chilean government. Comparing the population that is “theoretically” inactive in
relation to the “theoretically” active population measures an immigrant’s economic dependence.
Considering the percentage of immigrants that make up the total Chilean population, it is
difficult to determine whether this dependency impacts the Chilean-born population or the
economy itself. Graph 4 reveals that the total Venezuelan economic dependency was 15.8%,
which was three times higher than the overall economic dependence of Haitian immigrants in
2017 (INE 2017). Scrutinizing this information reveals that, in theory, Venezuelan immigrants
relied more on the Chilean economy. Despite the statistical data, in practice, Haitian immigrants
received the stricter visa requirements, which questions whether a perceived economic or
“cultural identity” threat caused the new visas.
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Public Opinions on Immigration
Exploring Chilean public opinion surveys uncovers the impact public sentiment had on
reforming immigration laws. It is necessary to determine the current Chilean-born population’s
reaction to the arrival of ethnically and culturally diverse immigrants. These public opinion
surveys are divided into two types of questions. The first set of surveys concentrate on the
perception, tolerance, and mindset towards immigration in general. These questions depict
whether Chileans felt threatened by the thought of all immigrants, and if it correlated with the
year the visas policies changed. The other set of surveys determine the same variables yet focus
on Haitian immigrants. This data provides a more direct understanding of Chilean opinions
towards Haitian immigrants; thus, providing further evidence to use inductive reasoning to
determine why the new visa laws restrict Haitian from immigrating to Chile. While surveys on
Chilean perspective of Venezuelan immigration would have been beneficial, none has been
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conducted thus far. Overall, these public opinion surveys provide adequate analysis of overall
Chilean attitudes towards immigration in Chile over the past five to ten years.

View on General Immigration
CADEM is a local Chilean company that has conducted surveys since 1975. The data
ranges from face-to-face, to web, and telephone surveys. CADEM surveys weekly on various
topics to provide current data on the Chilean public opinion (CADEM 2018a, b, c, and 2019).
The four initial survey questions ask how Chileans perceive the current number of immigrants, if
immigrants are good or bad for the country, whether the government should make more
restrictions, and approval of how the government is handling immigration. Each CADEM sample
asked 700-750 people through a telephone survey (CADEM 2018a, b, c, and 2019).
The first two questions analyze whether Chilean opinion changed as a result of an
increase in immigration. The first survey question asked, “Would you say that the current
number of immigrants in Chile is…?” and respondents answered with High, Normal, or Low
(Alto, Normal, Bajo) (CADEM 2018c). Analyzing data from 2016 and 2018 reveal whether the
influx of immigrants affected Chilean opinions. The second survey question was “Do you think
the arrival of immigrants to Chile is good or bad for the country?” and respondents answered
with Good, Bad, or Neither Good nor Bad (Bueno, Malo, Ni Bueno ni Malo) (CADEM 2018b).
In a similar manner, this graph analyzes data from 2016 and 2018 to show whether immigrant
arrival sparked negative or positive public sentiment.
Despite the immigrant population only making up 4.4% of the entire population (INE
2017), Graph 5 shows that from 2016 to 2018 Chileans perceived high immigrant rates. This
perception likely increased due to the rapid influx of immigrants. Although, the influx may not
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be high numerically, it was perceived by Chileans to be dramatic. In Graph 6, Chileans reported
that immigration was bad for the country from the end of 2016 until mid-2018. Nevertheless,
2018 data showed a significant decline in anti-immigration views, which is likely due to Haitians
leaving on humanitarian flights and the decrease in arrival of Haitian immigrants. Upon
evaluating each graph, I inferred that the public’s opinion on immigration affected President
Piñera’s decision to change the visas.
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Holding a similar bearing, I combined the survey data to analyze whether Chilean
opinion on immigration tolerance and approval correlated. The third survey question asks, “Do
you think Chile should maintain an open-door policy or place more restrictions on immigration?”
and respondents answered with Open Doors or Restrictions (Puertas Abiertas, Restricciones)
(CADEM 2018c and 2018 b). This graph examines data from 2016 and 2018 to show whether
the influx of immigrants changed Chilean opinions to make immigration stricter or more lenient.
The fourth survey question asks, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the government is
managing immigration in 2018?”. Answers for this question varied between Approve and
Disapprove (Aprueba, Desaprueba) (CADEM 2019). This graph consists of data from 2018
when President Piñera established the new visas, which is a key component for determining
Chilean support for stricter visas.
From 2016 to 2018, Graph 7 reveals that the few Chileans who did prefer an open-door
policy decreased. Exponentially, more Chileans support increasing immigration restrictions.
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Respectively, due to waves of immigration from 2016 to 2018, support continually increased.
Graph 8 shows that more Chileans supported the government’s management of immigration in
the year Piñera changed the visas. This information correlates with the study conducted on
Chilean media that showed how negative sentiments increased with the influx of immigrants.
Despite crime rates’ stagnation during the years in which immigrants arrived, Chilean sentiment
of their arrival turned negative. Because CADEM did not present this question before 2018, it is
not possible to look at previous years. Ultimately, analysis of the graphs supports the idea that
Chilean public opinion drove the change in immigration laws.
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View of Haitian Immigrants
Understanding the Chilean opinion on immigration is valuable to determine how willing
they will permit visas. However, survey questions specifically concerning Haitian immigration
provide a more nuanced interpretation of Chilean disdain towards the group. These surveys
originate from The Center for Conflict and Social Cohesion Studies (El Centro de Estudios de
Conflicto y Cohesión Social), which conducts a Longitudinal Study of Chile (Estudio
Longitudinal Social de Chile), which is a panel-type study that surveys nearly 3,000 Chilean
annually (COES 2018). I focus on the 2018 version of this study because it features questions on
the perceived threat from Haitian immigrants in Chilean society. This COES survey presented a
structured questionnaire that represents approximately 77% of the Chilean population (COES
2018). I utilize the survey to provide data on Chilean approval of the “Orderly Return Plan”
(Plan de Regreso Ordenado) which encourages Haitian emigration to Haiti (CADEM 2018a).
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The COES surveys asked for the “Effects of positive contact with immigrants on the
perception of a realistic threat/symbolic threat” (Efecto del contacto positivo con inmigrantes
sobre percepción de amenaza realista/amenaza simbólica) (COES 2018). Each survey question
displayed how groups with “Low Positive Contact, Medium Positive Contact, and High Positive
Contact” (Bajo Contacto Positivo, Medio Contacto Positivo, Alto Contacto Positivo) felt either a
realistic or symbolic threat. The “Realistic Threat” discussed that with the arrival of Haitians in
Chile, unemployment rates were threatened. On the other hand, the “Symbolic Threat” states that
Chileans believe they lose their identity as Haitians arrive (COES 2018). Both surveys present a
comparative study on Chile’s threat perception according to their levels of interaction with
Haitian immigrants. Graph 9 reveals a negative correlation between positive contact and both the
Realistic and Symbolic Threat. Therefore, as the rate of positive contact decreases, Chileans
perceive more of each threat. This shows that each perceived threat increased with the thought of
Haitian immigrants, rather than actual contact with them.
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The survey from CADEM focuses on Chilean opinion of the “Orderly Return Plan”,
which is for Haitians to return to Haiti (CADEM 2018a). In general, CADEM concentrates on
immigration questions rather than ones that are country specific. However, because immigration
influxes greatly affected public concern on the topic, CADEM conducted the question: “Do you
agree or disagree with the government-organized Orderly Return Plan of Haitians?” (¿Usted está
de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con el Plan de Regreso Ordenado de haitianos organizado por el
gobierno?). Respondents answered with “Agree” or “Disagree” (En Acuerdo, Desacuerdo)
(CADEM 2018a). In Graph 10, 88% of Chileans show approval towards the government’s
decision to provide free flights to return Haitian immigrants. However, regardless of this
overwhelming quantitative analysis, qualitative analysis of the “Orderly Return Plan” shows
Chileans’ momentous support in the removal of Haitian immigrants, despite the economic
resources required to purchase those flights.
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Geist 39

Public Perception of the Economy
Statistics of the demographics of each immigrant population, granted visas, public
opinion surveys on immigration, etc., can only provide so much analysis as to whether changing
immigration laws aligns with an economic or cultural identity threat. Due to the ambiguity of the
“cultural identity”, it is imperative to determine if there was a correlation between the perception
of the economy prior to changing the laws. Isolating Chilean perception of their economic status
prior to the visa amendment and disassociating immigration, further solidifies this thesis. During
this section, I reiterate that there is no correlation between household income and presidential
support (LAPOP 2019) because statistically, Chilean’s socioeconomic status does not reflect
their support for President Piñera. Also, it provides further analysis of Chile’s perceived need to
protect their economic status during inundation of immigration.
Data from the Center of Public Studies (Centro de Estudios Públicos) shows if Chileans
determined their personal economic growth as progressing or regressing economically in recent
years (CEP 2019). CEP is a private non-profit academic foundation that conducts a National
Study of Public Opinion (Estudio Nacional de Opinión Pública) to exhibit Chilean’s perceptions
on various topics such as the politics, economy, and societal problems. In 2019. approximately
1,400 were surveyed through face-to-face interview (CEP 2019). Analysis of this data indicates
whether Chileans faced personal economic instability during the years when immigration laws
became stricter.
The survey question asked, “How would you rate your current economic situation?”
(¿Cómo calificaría usted su actual situación económica?). Respondents answered with
“Bad/Very Bad”, “Neither Good nor Bad”, or “Good/Very Good” (Mala/Muy Mala, Ni Buena ni
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Mala, Buena/Muy Buena). Graph 11 shows that from 2007 until 2019, Chileans thought of their
economic situation as relatively stable, meaning that Chileans believed their current economic
situation was neither good nor bad. Seeing that the Chileans perceived neither a positive nor a
negative effect on their economic status, this makes the opinions less polarizing. This data
coincides with the theory that visas did not change due to a perceived economic threat. For this
reason, Chileans reporting a lack of economic hardship upon the arrival of Haitian immigrants
contradicts the economic approach, which claims that Haitian immigrants are an economic
threat.
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The other survey question derives from Latinobarómetro (Latin Barometer), which
provides data on public opinions in Latin American countries (Latinobarómetro 2018b). Its
studies consist of around 20,000 interviews in 18 countries across Latin America to investigate
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the development of democracy, the economy, and society (Latinobarómetro 2018b). I
implemented this information to compare the relative economic prosperity of Chile since 2010
and its effects on the perceived economic threat from immigrants.
The survey asked the question, “Do you think the country’s current economic situation is
better, the same, or worse than it was a year ago?” (¿Considera que la situación económica actual
del país está mejor, igual, o peor que hace doce meses?). Respondents answered with “Better”,
“Same”, or “Worse” (Mejor, Igual, Peor). I focus on the data that was available from 2010 to
present day Chile. This enables me to analyze the potential effects of the perception of the state’s
economy on changing the immigration laws. Like Graph 11, Graph 12 reveals that from 2010 to
2018, most respondents believed the overall economy remained the same. Therefore, this graph
also contradicts the economic approach because it shows that Chileans did not find their
economic status to be deteriorating during the influx of immigrants.
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Graph 12 (Latinobarómetro 2010, 2011, 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018a)
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At first glance, it is important to include survey data targeting how immigrants might
affect Chilean citizen’s opinions of their personal economic stability, none have been conducted
thus far. Despite this, I find that the surveys presented in this section sufficiently prove that
Chileans experienced no effect on their economic status during the years Chile received influxes
of immigrants. Therefore, there is a significant lack of consistency for the economic approach,
which supports President Piñera changing the immigration policies as a result of the current
population fearing economic instability.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Based on my research, I conclude that dedicating specific immigration visas to
Venezuelan and Haitian immigrants in 2018 is more consistent with the “cultural identity” threat,
rather than the economic threat. I recommend that additional conclusive data, such as analyzing
the future effects of the visas on the Haitian immigrant population and Chilean society, would
further solidify my findings.
Compiling data on the total population of Haitian immigrants in comparison to the native
Chilean population showed that Haitians make up less than 1% of the total population as the 6th
largest immigrant group in Chile. Subsequently, Venezuelan immigrants pose three times more
economic reliance on Chile’s economy. Therefore, Haitian immigrants did not pose more of a
threat to Chile’s financial security. Ranking 71st globally, Chile’s immigrant population is
insignificant in comparison to other countries. As a result, President Piñera restricting one of its
smaller immigrant groups is unlikely to have an impact on its total immigrant population.
Public surveys illustrated that from 2016 to 2018, Chilean believed that immigration rates
were high and confidently supported the government’s management of immigration. Towards the
end of 2018, support for immigration reform continued to rise. This coincides with the
implementation of humanitarian flights deporting Haitians home and the decline of the Haitian
immigrant population due to the newly restricted visas. As a result, in 2018, with the new visas,
Chileans began to receive the immigrants they “preferred”. These desired immigrants reflected
Chilean’s cultural identity, whereas Haitians did not. Decidedly, the number of temporary visas
granted pales in comparison to the definitive permanency visas permitted. This corresponds with
the Chilean population’s apparent contempt for Haitian immigrants before the visas changed in
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2018. Moreover, a majority of the Chilean population agreed with the humanitarian flights
sending Haitian nationals to their country of origin. Above all, the data links Chile’s perception
of immigration reform with the influx of Haitian immigrants and their departure and restricted
travel to Chile. Chiefly, this shows that Chileans found Haitian immigrants the primary threat to
their nation.
Further opinion surveys revealed that regardless of the threat perceived by the native
Chilean population, it significantly increased with less positive contact with Haitian immigrants.
Analysis of this data shows that the visual perception of Haitian immigrants, rather than direct
contact, increases the threat Chileans perceive. I assess that this discernment is due to Haitians
distinguishingly unique “cultural identity” and difficulty in conforming to the homogenous
ethnicity and culture of Chile.
Finally, in the year immediately before reforming visas, the opinions on economic
perception showed that most Chileans found both their economic situation and the actual
economy of Chile, as neither significantly good nor bad. In brief, the lack of a sudden increase or
decrease in Chilean’s perceived financial security contradicts the theory that Haitian immigrants
posed an economic threat. In the case that Chileans had felt their economic security threatened, it
is likely that due to the small number of Haitians in Chile, it would not have had an impact. This
analysis aligns with the theory that Chileans did not believe the influx of immigration affected
their financial security, proving the creation of stricter visas was likely due to a “cultural
identity” threat.
Ultimately, it is easier to refute that the economic approach resulted in the change in
immigration laws rather than finding a correlation with the “cultural identity” theory. It is
challenging to definitively prove that the “cultural identity” theory is the sole causation of
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changing immigration laws due to the subjective, and possibly offensive nature of the necessary
research. However, this case study provides an umbrella of evidence encompassing the perceived
“cultural identity” threat that caused Chile to restrict Haitian immigrants.
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Chapter 6: Appendices
Appendix 1: Venezuelan and Haitian Visas
Appendix 2: Types of Residencies Granted to Immigrants
Appendix 3: Pictures of Discrimination Against Haitian Immigrants
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Appendix 1

A
Temporary Visa of Democratic Responsibility: Venezuela
This visa may only be requested in the consulates of Chile in Venezuela. Confers
permission of temporary residence for an extended year. After the year, the visa

Purpose:
holder can request definitive permanence and after two years, must ask for
definitive stay.
-Background check effective for 3 months
-Valid Passport

Requirements:
-5 x 5 color picture with a white background
-Birth certificate required for minors

B
Simple Tourist Consular Visa: Haiti
Effective beginning on April 16, 2018, Haitian citizens who wish to travel to Chile

Purpose:

for tourism reasons must first obtain a consular tourist visa, which is processed at
the Chilean consulate in any country where they are located.
-Valid passport for the period of stay
-Background check effective for 3 months
-Hotel reservation

Requirements:
-Invitation letter
-Accreditation of economic solvency
-Copy of purchased (round trip) tickets
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C
Temporary Family Reunification Visa: Haiti
Family reunification of Haitian citizens, the Government of Chile allows a 1-year
visa, which can be extended. After the year, the visa holder can ask for the definite
permanence, and after two years, must request definitive stay. It can be requested by

Purpose:
spouses, civil cohabitants, children under the age of 24 who study until age 24, and
do not have a criminal record. It can be requested only at the visa center of the
International Organization of Migration in Haiti, upon request for an appointment.
-Valid Passport
-Background check valid for 3 months

Requirements:
-Accreditation of a duly legalized family member, with Haitian citizen residing in
Chile (spouse, civil cohabitant, a minor who studied until 24 years of age)
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Appendix 2

A
Temporary Residence
Permit residence granted to foreigners who intend on settling in Chile for a
Intention:
limited time who can apply from abroad
Duration:

Unspecified
-Foreigners who can prove family ties with Chileans of definitive residents
-Foreigners who enter the country to carry out lawful paid activities
-Foreigners established in the country with the aim of studying in staterecognized educational establishments
-Seasonal workers, who enter the country for limited periods, to perform
specific seasonal work

Requirements:

-Those who are subject to the custody of Gendarmerie of Chile or with a
current judicial process
-For humanitarian reasons
-Foreigners covered by international agreements ratified by Chile
-Officially recognized religious organizations
-For medical treatment
-Retirees or renters
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B
Definitive Residence
Intention:

A residence permit to settle indefinitely in Chile
Temporary residents who have resided in the country in such quality may
apply for at least 24 months and may be extended to 48 months if they do not

Duration:
meet some minimum requirements. The application may be made at 12
months of temporary residence in the following cases.
-Family ties with definitive nationals or residents
-Official missions carried out in Chile
-Available for rent or pensions
Requirements:
-Executed investments and/or companies attesting to effective operation in
Chile
-Contribute to the social, cultural, artistic, scientific and sporting sphere
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Appendix 3
A: Picture of a humanitarian flight returning immigrants to Haiti

B: Picture of a Haitian caricature in Santiago, Chile
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C: Picture of a protest that occurred following the death of Joane Florvil
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